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## **GA WAND Seeks NRC Suspension of Reactor Licensing at Plant Vogtle, Urging Serious Review of Fukushima Implications**

Georgia WAND, working with the communities living within the 20-40 mile radius of Plant Vogtle, is concerned that the NRC's "business as usual" approach to licensing is completely inconsistent with the serious-minded review of U.S. nuclear power that took place after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, when the NRC Commissioners suspended all licensing decisions until it had investigated the regulatory implications of the accident.

“We see this disaster through a human lens, feeling the devastating impact that this nuclear nightmare has wrought on the people of Japan. Out of this tragedy, we have an opportunity to revisit “what went wrong” and to understand the danger of an extended power outage - a risk that exists at every nuclear power plant in America. ” said Bobbie Paul, Executive Director of Georgia WAND (Georgia Women’s Action for New Directions)

Georgia WAND, one of 45 groups and individuals from across the nation, is formally asking the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to immediately suspend all licensing and other activities at 21 proposed nuclear reactor projects, including Plant Vogtle. The group contends that before acting on any applications for new reactor construction permits or operating licenses, early site permits, renewed licenses for existing reactors, or design certification rulemakings for new reactors, the NRC should complete a full investigation into the safety and environmental implications of the ongoing catastrophic nuclear facility accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Units 1-6 in Okumu, Japan.

In light of the Fukushima disaster, Georgia WAND is particularly concerned with three issues at Plant Vogtle relating to spent fuel stored on site, cascading impacts of damaged reactors, and seismic activity in the area.

First, the safety and environmental impacts of onsite spent fuel storage must be reevaluated. Two nuclear reactors (Unit 1&2) are currently in operation at Plant Vogtle – spent fuel from these reactors

remains onsite. The storage of this fuel, coupled with the spent fuel from proposed Units 3 and 4, could pose significant threats to the environment, public health, and safety. The Fukushima disaster must be studied to ensure the containment structures for spent fuel storage at Plant Vogtle are robust, the storage density is appropriate, and water supplies and back-up power for cooling are sufficient.

Second, the impact of a power failure on the reactor cooling systems at Plant Vogtle must be reevaluated in light of the Fukushima disaster. Based on preliminary reports, it appears the containment structures surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi reactors were damaged for multiple reasons, including the overheating of reactor cores. And, this overheating did not occur in isolation. Rather the damage caused by overheating had cascading impacts, resulting in an entire plant shutdown. The impacts of a power failure on these two reactors – which, like the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, rely on an active cooling system – and the cascading impacts on Units 3 and 4 should be reassessed. Moreover, the impacts of a power failure on the Units 3 and 4 – which could prevent the proper functioning of the water recirculation pumps and passive cooling system – should also be reevaluated.

Third, Plant Vogtle lies in an area prone to seismic activity. The Fukushima disaster must be studied to ensure the reactors at Plant Vogtle are capable of withstanding earthquakes of an appropriate magnitude.

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